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"..a market economy and its disciplines o¤er the best way of
raising living standards. But a market economy cannot survive
on incentives alone. It must align those incentives to the common
good. It must command support among the vast majority who
do not receive the large rewards that accrue to the successful and
the lucky. And it must show a sense of fairness if its e¢ ciency is
to yield fruit." Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England,
Speech to Trades Union Congress, September 15th 2010.
1 Introduction
While it seems likely that the worst of the nancial crisis of 2008 has passed,
most of the structural issues that lay behind it remain unresolved. This paper
focuses on one of these the distortions in incentive pay due to government
protection of investors from downside risk. One of the main legacies of the
traumatic events of 2008 was a stark reminder that many risky investments
are not subject to normal downside market discipline when they fail, they
receive publicly funded bailouts. This distorts the supply price of risk capital
and the behavior of nancial intermediaries.
In this paper, we focus on a key aspect of the distortion the e¤ect on
the structure and level of incentive pay. We develop a model of bonus pay
in a market equilibrium setting with two aspects of decision making by -
nancial sector workers risk-taking and e¤ort. We use this to focus on two
questions: (i) what is the incidence (in theory) of the substantial government
subsidy that accrues to the nancial sector and how does this a¤ect compen-
sation? (ii) what distortions do public subsidies induce in decision making
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ex ante? On the rst of these, we argue that subsidies could be shifted to
mobile nancial sector works and on the second, we argue that there will be
a tendency towards too much risk taking and too little productive e¤ort. In
short, bailouts reduce both e¢ ciency and equity.
We develop a framework which incorporates the classic public economics
approach where the policy makers objective reects a concern for both e¢ -
ciency and equity when considering the value of a public intervention (see,
for example, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980)). In the same tradition, there is
also a question about the ultimate incidence of a tax or subsidy. It is well-
known that where a tax or subsidy is remitted/received may be a poor guide
to where it falls which depends on the underlying competitive structure and
scarcity of factors. In our core case, we assume that talent in the nancial
sector is the main scarce input and hence all taxes and subsidies are shifted
to workers. But since it is their incentives that matter for the conduct of
the nancial sector, this has implications for economic e¢ ciency.
In this paper, we home in on the consequences of bailouts to investors in
risky assets on the structure of bonus pay. As a benchmark, we derive the
socially optimal structure of incentives. This factors in the impact on risk
taking and e¤ort which determine the e¢ ciency of nancial intermediation.
But policy makers may also care about the rewards that accrue to nan-
cial sector workers. We show that limited liability results in such workers
optimally earning a rent but the size of that rent will depend on societys
preferences about income distribution and policy makers may prefer to have
a less e¢ cient nancial system in order to reduce inequality. However, there
are limits to this as workers may be paid an e¢ ciencyutility.
We also derive the unregulated market equilibrium assuming that talented
nancial sector workers are scarce. This leads to all subsidies being shifted
to such workers which reduces both equity and e¢ ciency. We show how
remuneration packages will be designed to induce excessive risk taking.
Finally, we study optimal policy and show that the socially optimal out-
come can be implemented using a combination of a regulation on the struc-
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ture of bonuses and a tax on their level. This division of labor between
policies has the plausible feature that, in principle, regulators can make a
purely technocratic judgement while tax designers focus on social prefer-
ences about equity and the e¢ ciency of the nancial sector. The latter is
inevitably a social judgement which must be made by elected politicians.
One important feature of the analysis that we highlight throughout is a
clear understanding of the distinction between two issues: the structure and
level of bonus pay. The rise in the pay of bankers relative to others and
the role of bonuses in this is well documented. For example, Bell and Van
Reenen (2010) note that over the decade from 1998, the top 10% of workers
by income in the UK economy had an increase in their wage share from
27% to 30%. The majority of this went to the top 1% and nancial sector
workers accounted for 75% of these gains. In 2008 this accounted for £ 12
billion and almost all of it resulted from bonus pay, rather than an increase
in base salary. Also, these bonuses were mostly paid in cash on the basis
of short-term returns unadjusted for risk and it is widely agreed that this
increased incentives for risk-taking. In the analysis below, we show how the
structure of bonus pay distorts risk-taking while the level of bonus pay a¤ects
inequality and the overall e¢ ciency of the nancial intermediation sector.
Protection of investors downside risks using public money appears to
be a ubiquitous feature of modern nancial systems. As we discuss below,
this could be due to some form of altruism where the government prefers to
insulate individuals from the risks they face. However, it could also be due
to successful lobbying on the part of investors. Either way, this prevents the
government from committing not to bailout investors in future. Recognizing
this puts us squarely in a second-best world akin to a Samaritans dilemma
(see Buchanan (1975)). And this distortion needs to be recognized when
considering taxation and regulation of the nancial sector.
While the massive bank bailouts in 2008 were headline grabbing, it is im-
portant to realize that modern states routinely protect investors from down-
side investment risk. Standard depositor protection in the retail banking
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sector is common place. However, the protective covenant of the state runs
much deeper than this with a range of implicit or explicit guarantees on a
variety of investment funds, such as private pensions or money market funds.
More generally, it operates in other sectors of the economy as well, such as
the bailout of the automobile industry, and can be seen to arise whenever
there is a soft budget constraint. Since the current nancial crisis began in
earnest, there have been a range of explicit bailouts of the nancial sector
with banks and insurance companies receiving public injections of capital in
a number of countries including the U.S., U.K., Ireland and Switzerland. All
of these interventions subsidize the supply price of capital to the nancial
sector. Most private pension plans, which constitute a huge fraction of pri-
vately held assets at risk in a number of countries are implicitly or explicitly
underpinned by some form of state guarantee. The U.S. government had
little hesitation in seeking to guarantee investments in money market funds
in the heat of the crisis. The potential costs of such interventions could have
added up to many trillions of dollars. Thus, it is hard to quantify the impact
of these many implicit guarantees. However, Haldane (2010) suggests that
the cost of bailouts in the UK is around £ 20bn or around 1% of GDP and for
the U.S., the gure is around $100bn which is also around 1% of GDP. While
he acknowledges that these gures are imprecise, it is clear that the sums
involved are signicant. And this is without even recognizing that systems
of social insurance and government transfer programs insulate citizens from
the true consequences of their risky investment decisions.
The distributional goal at the heart of such policies may well make sense
given that the losers are often not wealthy. For example, in the case of
pensions, some kind of public guarantee is typically needed to encourage
people to take on the risk of private pensions. There is nothing wrong per
se with the social judgement that nobody should be left destitute in old age
if they have saved for their retirement. But it has to be recognized that
this has implications for how the nancial system works and manages risk.
The government may pursue a variety of means to minimize the likelihood
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that investors have to draw on public guarantees and some of the recent
discussion about structural reform in the nancial sector speak to this issue.1
We believe that the issue is broader than "too big to fail". If the objective
is to protect citizens who invest in risky assets, then even small nancial
institutions will have their incentives a¤ected by public guarantees.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we discuss some related literature. In section three, we lay out the model.
Section four derives socially optimal incentives. Section ve characterizes the
market equilibrium. Section six shows that the optimum can be implemented
via a combination of a regulation on the structure of bonuses and a tax
on their level. Section seven discusses some extensions of the model with
concluding comments in section eight.
2 Related Literature
There is now a growing literature on arguments for regulating incentive pay in
light of distortions in the nancial sector. At the heart of all such arguments
typically lies a failure of the market to price risk correctly with the two main
culprits being the existence of bailouts (or any public policies which mitigate
downside risks for investors) and/or behavioral issues in the management of
risk. These issues are explored in general by Bebchuk and Spamann (2010).
Bolton, et al (2010) observe that bailouts in the form of deposit insur-
ance (or naive debt holders) lead to excessive risk-taking. They observe that
basing compensation on the price of debt (CDS spreads) can improve in-
centives. Radulescu (2010) looks at taxation of bonuses and Hakenes and
Schabel (2010) argues that there should be ceiling on bonuses in the pres-
ence of bailouts. Thanassoulis (2011a, b) considers arguments in favour of
regulating bonus pay when there are negative externalities from risk-taking
decisions across banks. Garicano and Lastra (2010) argue that making bank-
ruptcy credible, adjusting risk-premia in capital allocation, and claw-back of
bonuses in the event of failure are likely to be more useful than taxes. Farhi
1See, for example, The Squam Lake Report (2010).
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and Tirole (2011) show that bailouts to distressed institutions makes private
leverage choices strategic complements, which leave little choice to authori-
ties but to intervene.
Our paper is related to a large literature in incentive theory that ex-
plores the design of optimal contracts when the choice of riskiness by agents
is unobservable, for example, Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) and Biais and
Casamatta (1999).2 Ghatak and Pandey (2000) in the context of agricultural
tenancy and Palomino and Prat (2003) in the context of nance analyze moral
hazard in both e¤ort and risk-taking, as we do in this paper. However, this
literature does not explore the consequences of distortions other than those
which create standard incentive problems. Myerson (2010) develops a model
where the dynamic interplay between incentive pay of nancial intermediaries
of di¤erent generations can create equilibrium credit cycles, with repeated
booms and recessions. Also related is the literature on bank regulation, in-
cluding deposit insurance. It discusses the relationship between managerial
incentive schemes, deposit insurance and bank regulation.3
Finally, the paper is related to the policy literature on the Samaritans
dilemma initiated in Buchanan (1975). This refers to situations where the
government is unable to commit not to make a transfer to some group ex post
which a¤ects their ex ante risk taking incentives. The question is then how
government policy anticipates this lack of commitment power. Coate (1995),
for example, shows that such considerations can underpin the theoretical case
for compulsory insurance.
3 The Model
We employ a very simple equilibrium model of nancial intermediation to
make the main points of interest. Intermediaries compete to employ work-
ers who chose investment projects and raise funds for these projects from
2See Tirole (2006, Chapter 7) for a discussion of this literature.
3See, for example, John et al, (2000) for a theoretical analysis, Gorton, (1994) and
Bhattacharya, Boot, and Thakor, (1998) for reviews of the literature, and Levine, (2004)
for a review of evidence from various cross country studies.
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investors in competitive capital markets.
There are three groups of citizens with, for simplicity, membership of each
group being mutually exclusive. There are M > 1 consumers each of whom
has an endowment 1 unit of capital. The economy comprises N nancial
intermediaries and n potential nancial sector workers. Each nancial inter-
mediary can hire at most one nancial sector worker. Each agent can manage
one unit of capital. We assume thatM > N > n so that capital is not scarce
but skilled agents are. This assumption will imply that any rents to nancial
intermediation accrue to nancial sector workers. Neither intermediaries nor
nancial workers have any wealth that can be posted as a performance bond
and their payo¤s are subject to a limited liability constraint. We will return
to this issue below.
Consumers are risk neutral and have access to a safe asset which yields a
gross return of  > 1. This implies that there is a perfectly elastic supply of
M units of capital as long as intermediaries pay an expected return of .
Financial intermediaries invest in risky projects. There are three states
of the world s 2 fL;M;Hg with corresponding returns:
H > M >  > L = 0:
The likelihood of the realization of these returns is a¤ected by the actions
of nancial sector workers. These can be thought of concretely as decisions
about which projects to invest in. There are two dimensions of choice:
productive e¤ort e 2 [e; 1] and risk-taking e¤ort r 2 [0; r] where e > 0 and
r < 1:
E¤ort increases investment returns in the sense of rst order stochastic
dominance while the choice of r transfers probability mass away from the
middle return towards the high and low returns. We propose a technology
which is additively separable between risk-taking and e¤ort. Let ps (e; r)
denote the probability that the return is s. Then, the probability distribution
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over investment returns is as follows:
pH(e; r) = e+ r (1)
pM(e; r) = (1  )e  r
pL(e; r) = (1  e) + (1  )r
where  2 (0; 1); and  2 (0; 1). We assume  +  < 1 which is su¢ cient to
ensure that pH(e; r) < 1 for all e 2 [e; 1] and r 2 [0; r]. We also assume that
(1   )e   r > 0 which implies that 1 > (1   e) + (1   )r : Thus, for any
choice of e and r, all three states occur with positive probability.
The cost to the intermediary of choosing (e; r) is assumed to be quadratic
and additively separable: C(e; r) = 1
2
e2+ 1
2
r2. We will refer to the individual
cost function for each action to be c(x)  1
2
x2 (where x = e; r). This implies
that the agent has to seek out risk-taking opportunities at a cost to himself
and without any incentives, will not take any risks.4
To attract capital a nancial intermediary pays a contractual return of
R when its it makes a positive prot. We assume that investors cannot
distinguish between the states H and M , while the nancial intermediaries
can. Since no cash returns are generated when the state is L, there is no
option to o¤er a return in this case. However, the government can choose
to bail the investor out and return    in this case. In section 7.1, we
discuss some possible micro-foundations for this. Given that all parties are
risk neutral in the model, we could interpret  as the expected value of any
bailout, i.e. the probability of receiving a bailout times the amount received.
Given the bailout, the investor receives R with probability 1   pL(e; r)
and  with probability pL(e; r): Since investment funds are plentiful, the
intermediary has to o¤er an expected return of  to the investor so that R
solves:
[1  pL(e; r)]R + pL(e; r) = . (2)
4We focus the analysis on the case where a safe option is costless. It would be straight-
forward to extend the model to introduce a normalor benchmarklevel of risk taking
r^ > 0 and to suppose that it is costly to deviate from that level. In this case the cost of
e¤ort would be 12 (r   r^)2.
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In general R   with a bigger bailout () implying a lower value of R.
We focus on the simplest form of public nance with bailouts being -
nanced by lump-sum taxes levied on consumers. We will suppose that there
is a resource cost involved in organizing these bailouts denoted by ; mak-
ing a transfer of a dollar to an investor who loses her money therefore costs
(1 + ) to the taxpayers. In this case, the per capita tax needed to nance
expected losses is:
T = (1 + ) [1  e+ (1  ) r] :
For future reference, it is convenient to dene:
A (x) = H + (1  )M   x
and
B (x) = H + (1  )x  M :
These expressions are the private marginal return to a nancial intermediary
from a marginal increase in, respectively, e¤ort, and risk in the presence of a
bailout of size x. Without a bailout (x = 0) these are also the social marginal
return from a marginal increase in e¤ort and risk. Observe that the bailout
makes the private marginal return from e¤ort lower and that from risk higher
compared to the social marginal returns.5
For convenience, we make the following four-part assumption governing
restrictions on the parameter ranges that we study:
Assumption:
(i) A()
2+B()2
4
+  >  for all   .
(ii) M  e (1 )r .
(iii) B (0) = 0.
(iv) 1 > A (0) and r > B ()
5Since    < M , A() and B() are strictly positive.
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The rst of these gives a su¢ cient condition for investment in risky projects
to be protable ex ante even in the presence of a bailout and to ensure that
trade takes place in all the cases that we study.6 The second assumption
ensures that, even without a bailout, the intermediary can credibly promise
a su¢ cient return to the investor to compensate him for risk for any choice of
e and r. The third says that greater risk-taking, in the absence of a bailout,
generates a purely mean-preserving spread in returns. It also implies the
following parameter restriction: H = M : The fourth guarantees that
solutions are interior for  2 [0; ].
The workers in the rm receive a state-contingent wage (wH ; wM ; wL) with
the relationship between these wages determining the extent to which incen-
tives are high powered. The fact that the intermediary has no cash when
the state is L implies that wL = 0. The payo¤ of the nancial intermediary
is therefore:
W = pH(e; r) (H   wH  R) + pM(e; r) (M   wM  R)
Using (2) and (1), this can be written conveniently as:
W () = e [A ()  wH   (1  )wM ]+r [B ()  wH + wM ]+ : (3)
This is increasing in the size of the expected bailout, , for xed values of
(e; r; wH ; wM).
Even though the investors are bailed out, the bailout is fully shifted to the
nancial intermediary via a change in the supply price of capital. Investors
continue to earn, in expected terms, the same they would earn without a
bailout, namely . This is a standard public nance argument about the
incidence of a subsidy in such circumstances. And it would not matter, as
a consequence, who the bailout cheque is paid to to the investors directly
or via intermediaries. In a competitive market for funds, our assumption
that there is a limited number of intermediaries means that there no direct
6If e and r are contractible, then the maximized value of W () is A()
2+B()2
2 +   .
Part (i) of the Assumption is stronger than the requirement that W () > 0 in this case.
It is a su¢ cient condition for the expected second-best surplus to be always positive, i.e.,
when e and r are non-contractible.
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ex ante benet to investors from a bailout if it is anticipated at the time of
making the investment. Having a bailout makes it cheaper for intermediaries
to raise capital. However, there is still an issue as we shall see below 
about how the gains from the bailout are shared by residual claimants to
prots of nancial intermediaries and nancial sector workers.
The ex ante utility of a nancial sector worker is:
u () = e [wH + (1  )wM ] + r [wH   wM ]  1
2
e2   1
2
r2: (4)
Dependence of the workers utility on  here is indirect, working through
changes in either wages, e¤ort or risk-taking. We will assume that they
have to receive a utility no less than an outside option denoted by u:7
We now use this model to study two main cases: (i) the socially optimal
bonus structure and (ii) the market equilibrium where intermediaries set pay
structures and compete for workers.
4 Socially Optimal Bonus Pay
It is best to think of the social optimum as a situation where the nancial
sector is being run in the public interest and being controlled by the gov-
ernment. This will internalize in the objective any bailout costs which the
government will give after investment returns are realized. But we are as-
suming that a commitment not to pay the bailout is infeasible. However,
this is anticipated ex ante when determining incentives.
To study the optimal structure of pay, we use an ex ante measure of
welfare where the weight on the welfare of the consumers is one and the weight
on the welfare of workers in the nancial sector is  which could deviate from
one to reect the governments distributional preference.8 We will assume
7To ensure that the outside option is not binding in any of the cases that we study, we
assume that this does not exceed A()
2+B()2
2 +    .
8This is the simplest way to capture a distributional preference. For example, it is the
way that distributional preferences between prots and consumer surplus are captured
in the optimal regulation literature  see, for example, Baron and Myerson (1982). In
general, we might posit a social welfare function based on individual utilities, applying a
concave transformation to utility to represent a concern for equality. In the limit, this
could be a Rawlsian maximin preference which could crudely be captured by  = 0 in our
weighting scheme.
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that consumers are given shares in any surplus created in the nancial sector
and hence become residual claimants. This could also be implemented via a
tax on pure prots in the nancial sector which is distributed back to citizens.
Thus per capita welfare is:
S () =W () + u() + [  (1 + )f1  e+ (1  ) rg] :
This is an intuitive expression: it sums up the expected payo¤s of nancial
intermediaries, nancial sector workers (who as a group get a welfare weight
of ), and investors (who are the same as the group of taxpayers). The
bailouts are, in e¤ect, redistribution between groups of taxpayers depending
on whether they invest in a successful intermediary.
Substituting the values of W () and u() from (3) and (4) we obtain:
S() = [efA ()  wH   (1  )wMg+ rfB ()  wH + wMg+ ]
  (1 + ) [1  e+ (1  ) r]
+

efwH + (1  )wMg+ rfwH   wMg   1
2
e2   1
2
r2

(5)
4.1 Benchmark: Contractible e and r
To x ideas, let us briey study the case where e and r are observable and
veriable. Then, the government could choose them directly to maximize (5)
subject to the nancial sector workers getting a payo¤ of u  u. Observing
that A()+ (1+ ) = A( ) and B ()  (1+ ) (1  ) = B( ), we
can write (5) as:
S() =

eA ( ) + rB ( )  (1  )u     1
2
e2   1
2
r2

:
The expression is intuitive. From societys point of view, the net cost of the
bailout is  . In the low prot state the payment of  is just a transfer and
the real cost is just the resources used in bringing this about. Observe that
A ( ) > 0 and B ( ) < 0 (because, by Assumption (iii), B(0) = 0).
If  = 1 then all that matters is the total expected social payo¤ less the
disutility cost of the nancial sector worker. However, if  < 1 then social
welfare is lower, the higher is the utility of nancial sector workers.
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Maximizing this with respect to e and r yields: e = A ( ) and r =
0: E¤ort is now higher than in the absence of a bailout; this is because the
planner wishes to minimize the expected social cost. Since we have assumed
that r induces a mean-preserving spread in returns and is costly, risk-taking
should be set to zero. In fact, B ( ) < 0 because risk-taking induces
additional bailout costs.
The fact that   1, implies that u = u so the workers get their reser-
vation payo¤. However, this distributional judgment has no bearing on
e¢ ciency in the case of full contractibility there is complete separation be-
tween the pay of nancial sector workers and the e¢ cient operation of the
nancial sector. In addition, issues surrounding the optimal bonus structure
for nancial sector workers do not arise when e and r can be contracted over
directly.
4.2 Moral Hazard in e and r
It is not very plausible to suppose that the behavior of nancial sector work-
ers can be monitored costlessly and perfectly. So we now suppose that e
and r are private information and that nancial contracts therefore have to
be incentive-compatible. The incentive constraint (IC) for nancial sector
workers is obtained from:
max
fe;rg
(e+ r)wH + f(1  )e  rgwM   1
2
e2   1
2
r2
which yields:
e = wH + (1  )wM (6)
r = wH   wM
where we have assumed an interior solution. The two bonus levels can be
manipulated to implement a level of e¤ort and risk-taking. By solving (6)
we obtain:
wH =
e+ (1  )r
+ (1  ) (7)
wM =
e  r
+ (1  ) :
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An optimal second best nancial contract is a pair fwH ; wMg that maxi-
mizes the principals payo¤subject to limited liability, incentive-compatibility
and the agents participation constraint. We nd the solution in two stages:
corresponding loosely to caring about e¢ ciency and distribution.
Let us dene
S^ ( ; u)  max
fe;rg
fe [A ( )  e] + r [B ( )  r]  g
subject to:
1
2
e2 +
1
2
r2  u:
Notice that e [A ( )  e] is simply e [A ( )  wH   (1  )wM ] and
r [B ( )  r] is equal to r [B ( )  wH + wM ] using the incentive con-
straints (6). This is therefore the maximized value of the expected social
surplus (which takes into account the net cost of bailouts, ) subject to the
participation constraint of nancial sector workers, namely, they must have
an expected utility of at least u. The solution to this problem would give us
the e¢ cient combination of e¤ort and risk-taking for xed u:
The distributional decision for the social planner then solves for the utility
of nancial sector workers, u; given the welfare weight  which is given by:
u^ = argmax
uu
n
S^ ( ; u) + u
o
:
The solution to this two-stage problem is straightforward.9 Used in con-
junction with (7) it yields:
Proposition 1 In the socially optimal second-best nancial contract incen-
tives are high powered to provide e¤ort incentives, but is set to avoid risk-
taking. Specically:
wH () =
1
2  
A ( )
+ (1  )
wM () =
1
2  
A ( )
+ (1  )
with e¤ort and risk-taking choices being: e = A( )
2  and r = 0:
9The proof of this and subsequent results are in the appendix.
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There are three main features of this solution worth noting.
First, incentives are set to avoid risk-taking. This is achieved by setting
wH () = wM (). The bonus pay does not depend on the marginal return
from risk-taking, B( ) which is negative and depends only on the marginal
return from e¤ort, A ( ). This is the key observation about the structure
of bonus pay the ratio of pay in state H and state M is set so as to make
risk-taking unattractive. This limits the extent to which stateH is rewarded,
all else equal.
Second, incentives are high powered with wH () > wM () > wL ().
The optimal ratio of pay between state M and H is however not a¤ected
by the size of the bailout. This is because of the need to avoid risk-taking.
However, the level of incentive pay is higher, the larger the expected bailout.
This may seem surprising. However, since the policy maker is able to control
any socially adverse risk-taking incentives, she can concentrate on setting the
incentive to minimize the social cost associated with funding a bailout, i.e.,
to reduce the probability of state L. This underscores the problem in a lot
of popular discussion about bonus pay and incentives: a certain degree of
incentive pay is indeed socially productive.
Third, the result says something about the level of incentive pay and
the fact that it depends on societys distributional preferences. However,
since there is moral hazard and limited liability, there is an equity/e¢ ciency
trade-o¤ and society has to pick a point on the second-best utility frontier.
The level of incentive pay is increasing in , i.e. the greater the social value
attached to rewards in the nancial sector. Note that incentive pay is lowest
when  = 0 when the planner attaches no weight to the utility of nancial
sector workers. However, the latter continue to earn a rent (namely, the
participation constraint does not bind and so they earn the utility equivalent
of e¢ ciency wages) on account of the need to motivate them. This would
remain true even if nancial sector workers were not intrinsically scarce and
stems from the fact that unobserved e¤ort is required from these workers.
Thus, nancial sector workers are optimally treated as a kind of aristocracy
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on account of the need to provide incentives when liability is limited. Such
inequality is toleratedon the basis of the e¢ ciency gains in the manage-
ment of the sector.
Just how high the rewards to being a nancial sector worker are cannot
be determined a priori and depends on the structure of nancial returns and
the potential for e¤ort to increase these rewards. Financial sector rewards
will be higher still if  > 0. If society is indi¤erent to distribution, caring
only about social surplus regardless of distribution, i.e.,  = 1, then the
reward structure increases e¤ort further and generates more inequality.
In the way that we have framed this, the social planner could be a regula-
tor who monitors the returns to investment projects and determines permis-
sible pay structures as a function of these observables. At a practical level,
implementing the socially optimal solution would require full disclosure of
incentive pay by rms and a good knowledge of the underlying technology
for producing those returns. More problematically, a regulator would have
to make distributional judgements according to our model and represented
by the parameter  as there is no way of getting away from a fundamental
equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤. This means that the choice of policy is not purely
a matter of technocratic regulation but also has a distributional aspect. We
will return to this point in section 5 below, when we discuss the kinds of
policy instruments that are needed to implement the optimal outcome.
5 The Market Outcome
In a market, nancial intermediaries compete by o¤ering wage contracts to
workers. These contracts respect the fact that e¤ort and risk-taking are not
directly contractible. However, intermediaries will ignore the e¤ect of their
behavior on expected bailout costs, thereby creating a divergence between
the socially optimal bonus structure and the market determined outcome.
While we study a static model, we imagine a frictionless assignment prob-
lem where rms post wage contracts and then workers select rms (in this
case intermediaries) on the basis of the utility that they obtain. Thus, the
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market is clearedby an adjustment in the utility level received by workers.
As above, the incentive constraints yield (6). Using this in (3), we can
think of the principal in a nancial rm picking e¤ort and risk-taking directly.
Their payo¤ is:
S^ (; u)   = max
fe;rg
e [A ()  e] + r [B ()  r] +    
subject to:
1
2
e2 +
1
2
r2  u:
This is very similar to what we had in the case of the social planner with two
di¤erences: rst, the principal in a nancial rm does not take into account
the net cost of bailouts, and takes  as a positive net transfer, and second, it
views the cost of capital as a net cost  unlike the social planner who includes
the payo¤ of the investors in his objective function.
As long as there are values of wH 2 [0;H ] and wM 2 [0;M ] which
"implement" the preferred level of e and r, this will be a second-best optimal
nancial contract. The level of u then adjusts to clear the market for workers.
Since we have assumed that nancial sector workers are scarce then all of the
surplus will go to them, i.e. S^ (; u ()) = 0 where u () is the market
determined utility level of a nancial sector worker when the bailout is .
Before deriving the market determined solution, dene
 () =
1
2
"
1 +
s
1 +
4 (   )
A ()2 +B ()2
#
:
This function is is well-dened, given Assumption (i), and satises 0 <
 ()  1 for   .
We now have:
Proposition 2 In a market equilibrium, incentives are high powered and set
to encourage risk-taking. Specically,
wH () =
A () +B () (1  )
+ (1  )  ()
wM () =
A ()  B ()
+ (1  )  ()
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with e¤ort and risk-taking choices being e = A () () and r = B () () >
0.
The pernicious consequences of nancial sector bailouts on the market equi-
librium outcome are clear from this result.
First, the model delivers an insight which lies at the heart of the de-
bate about the structure of bonus pay namely that bonuses will encour-
age socially wasteful risk-taking. This is because with no account taken
of the social costs of bailouts B () > 0. As a consequence, we have
wH () > wM (). So incentives are too high powered compared to the
socially optimal solution. This is the fundamental distortion in the struc-
ture of bonus pay induced by bailouts.
Second, bailouts are also bad for e¤ort incentives (they lower A ()) lead-
ing to lower levels of e¤ort which does contribute towards producing high
returns.10 This is because they increase the return to failure.
Third, given the outcome described in Proposition 2, the utility of a
nancial sector worker is:
u () =
1
2
0@
q
A ()2 +B ()2 + 4 (   ) +
q
A ()2 +B ()2
2
1A2 : (8)
Thus, the utility of nancial sector workers is higher due to the bailout.
Competition between nancial rms leads to subsidies to investors being
shifted to workers. This is a classic public nance argument about the
incidence of a subsidy applied to our setting. It captures the intuition that
the real beneciaries of bailouts are scarce workers through competition in the
labor market. Hence, in a market equilibrium where nancial sector workers
are scarce, bailouts increase inequality as well as reducing e¢ ciency.11
It is interesting to ask what happens if  goes up? We can show that
in a market equilibrium, an increase in the level of bailouts () increases
10In addition, due to the standard incentives vs. rent extraction trade-o¤, e¤ort is less
than A() which would be the level achieved with full contractibility. This is because, as
noted above,  ()  1 as   :
11If nancial sector workers were not scarce, then some of the benets of bailout subsidies
would accrue to residual claimants in nancial sector rms.
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the equilibrium level of risk-taking. We know that A () goes down and
B () goes up. In addition, we can show that  () goes up.12 As a result,
risk-taking certainly goes up. E¤ort is subject to two opposing e¤ects: the
higher expected bailout dulls incentives by lowering A () but nancial sector
workers get more rents and this is reected in the increase in  () :
6 Optimal Policy
We now show that the second best optimum can be implemented by a combi-
nation of two policies: a regulation on the structure of bonuses, and a tax on
their level. The latter mirrors the kind of policies that have seen in practice.
For example, the UK Treasury introduced a one-time tax of 50% on bonuses
over £ 25,000 for the scal year 2009-10.
We consider regulations which a¤ect the structure of bonus pay by de-
termining the relationship between wH and wM . Specically, let  be such
that:
wH = wM :
Comparing, the market equilibrium and the planning optimum of the previ-
ous section makes clear why the prospect of bailouts will generate a market
failure which can be used to motivate direct regulation of bonus pay. But
the interplay of e¢ ciency and equity considerations complicates this.
The bonus tax that we consider is levied on the intermediary so that, for
every $1 of bonuses that it pays out, the cost is $1 + t where t is the tax
12It is straightforward to check that the sign of 0 () is the same as that of A ()2 +
B ()
2 2 (   ) (B () (1  ) A ()) :By Assumption (i), A ()2+B ()2+4 (   ) > 0:
Notice that     < 0 and so this would imply the above expression determining the sign
of 0 () is positive so long as A ()  (1  )B () < 2 which is true as A () 2 (0; 1) and
B ()  0:
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rate.13 The per capita tax revenue raised is
R (; ; t) = (e [+ (1  ) ]  (1  ) r [   ])wHt
and the payo¤ of the intermediary is
W (; ; t) = e [A ()  (1 + t)wH (+ (1  ) )]
+r [B ()  (1 + t)wH (   )] +    :
The dependence on (; ; t) here and below comes in part from the way in
which these policies a¤ect the choices of (wH ; wL; e; r). The utility of a
nancial sector worker is:
u(; ; t) = e [+ (1  ) ]wH + r [   ]wH   1
2
e2   1
2
r2:
The choices of e¤ort and risk-taking are now given by:
e = wH [+ (1  ) ]
r = max fwH [   ] ; 0g :
It is apparent from this that choosing  e¤ectively allows the policy maker to
inuence r. Assuming an interior solution, this yields the following utility
level for a nancial sector worker:
u(; ; t) =
(wH)
2
2

(   )2 + (+ (1  ) )2 :
Expected bailout costs are:
T (; ; t) = (1 + ) [1  wH [+ (1  ) ] + (1  )wH [   ]] :
In a market equilibrium, we continue to suppose that all supernormal
returns in the nancial sector accrue to workers through competition. This
13Tax policy is clearly bound up with more general debates about the optimal taxation
of income. But the argument that we are making here is somewhat di¤erent as we
are talking about a specic way to inuence the primary income distribution rather than
redesigning the income tax. This is motivated by having a model where any excess returns
in nancial markets show up as rents to workers in that sector. Thus, the motivation is
to tax those rents on the basis of the inequality that they generate. However, given that
the level of these rents is a¤ected by e¤ort, there is a trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and rent
extraction.
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implies that the bonus tax levied on rms is also shifted to workers. Hence,
the maximand for the policy maker is:14
u (; ; t) +R (; ; t)  T (; ; t) :
Our key result on optimal policy is as follows:
Proposition 3 The optimal choice of regulation and taxation (; t) has
 =  and
t =
A( )A()
(2 ) + (   )h
A( )
2 
i2   1
These policies implement the second best optimum that we described in
Proposition 1.
The optimal regulation is easy to understand as this sets the bonus struc-
ture to achieve r = 0.
The optimal tax regulates the level of bonuses and guarantees that, in
a world where all of the surplus is extracted by workers, the optimum of
Proposition 1 is implemented.
To understand the structure of optimal taxation, it is worth considering
a couple of special cases. First, suppose that  =  so that there is a bailout
which fully compensates investors when the project fails. The optimal tax
now becomes:
t =
(1  )A ()  (1 + ) 
A ( ) :
The rst term, (1  )A (), is positive and represents the desire to tax on
redistributive grounds. This term goes to zero if  = 1. The second term
is equal to A () A ( ), is negative and represents the desire to increase
e¤ort to reduce the prospect of a bailout. It is more negative, the higher is
the cost of the bailout. The optimal tax balances these forces. If  < ,
there is an additional negative term due to the fact that the rm faces a loss
which passes onto the workers which further reduces e¤ort.
14Observe that we do not apply 1 +  to the tax revenue. However, if  is interpreted
as the marginal cost of public funds rather than an administrative cost of organizing the
bailouts, we would do this.
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In general, there is no guarantee that the tax on bonuses will be positive.
Indeed as  ! 0, it is bound to be negative. This may seem surprising. But
it follows from the fact that paying  as compensation to investors enters the
social planners payo¤ as a transfer which is therefore ignored in setting the
optimal incentive scheme whereas the intermediary operates under the con-
straint of having to compensate investors for parting with their capital. But
the planner in our framework can, in principle, make transfers to overcome
this constraint.
Although obvious in the context of the discussion so far, it is worth un-
derlining that neither a tax nor a regulation on the structure of bonuses alone
can achieve the second best optimum. That said, a regulator could simply
mandate that bonuses are as in Proposition 1. However, a nice feature of the
way of looking at policy suggested in this section is that it corresponds to a
reasonable division of policy responsibilities between institutions along the
lines of that we see in practice.
The regulation is a purely technocratic decision based on knowledge of the
production technology for risk-taking as represented in our simple model by
. It a¤ects the structure but not directly the level of bonuses. Practically
speaking, this could be a decision made by a nancial regulator or a central
bank.
By contrast, the optimal tax is clearly a political decision as signied here
by its dependence on the distributional judgement embodied in . The social
judgement on equity and e¢ ciency is typically legitimized by some kind of
electoral process and falls clearly outside the scope of technocratic policy
making. Quite rightly this should remain the domain of nance ministries.
What matters is that both kinds of policies are applied if the second-best
optimum is to be realized.
It is important to note in closing this discussion of taxation and regu-
lation that these instruments are an alternative to having the government
directly choose the salary structures for nancial sector workers. This could
be achieved, for example, with nationalization of the nancial sector. There
23
is nothing in our model which justies privately owned and operate nan-
cial intermediaries. To delve into these issues more deeply would require
extending the model to consider the costs and benets of public ownership.
7 Further Issues
The model that we have presented is extremely stylized. It is a vehicle
for exploring the logic of the arguments but is far from an applicable model
which could be used to design any kind of specic policy. In this section, we
discuss a number of further issues and extensions to the basic framework.
7.1 Endogenous Bailouts
We have taken the bailout level as exogenous throughout. We now discuss
how this could be given foundations and how this might have a bearing on
the results.
One foundation for the bailout would be to consider the actions of a
benevolent government which cannot commit not to insure its citizens against
losses incurred in investing in risky assets. Suppose that the government had
a "maximin" distributive preference then it would want to make a transfer
towards those who lose their money in risky investments. Making them
as well o¤ as those who have invested in safe assets would imply setting
the bailout at a level  < . This corresponds roughly to how the U.K.
government compensates those who lose their money in bankrupt private
sector pensions schemes under the Pension Protection Fund. Our analysis
can be read as saying that this ex post redistribution now requires an ex ante
intervention so as to mitigate the adverse consequences for the behavior of
intermediaries. And the logic follows the Samaritans dilemma problem that
we mentioned above. Given the increasing importance of private pensions in
many countries, this bailout problem is likely to get greater to the extent that
governments o¤er such protection. Our argument says that this necessitates
some kind of bonus pay regulation to the extent that risk taking behavior
cannot be monitored directly.
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An alternative perspective on the bailout is to see it as the product of ex
post lobbying depending on the scale of the losses that are faced by investors.
To illustrate this argument, consider a world where there are two identical
intermediaries labelled as i 2 f1; 2g. We assume that each will lobby for a
bailout if their project fails. However, we assume that they are successful in
their lobbying e¤orts only when both projects fail, it requires a large enough
political constituency. For simplicity, suppose that if a bailout is received
then it as the level of , the safe return.
Consider the perspective of rm i (rm j is symmetric). In the event
that its project fails, the investors expected bailout is:
i = pL (ej; rj) ;
i.e. it gets  only when rm js project also fails.
The fact that the expected bailout depends on the behavior of inter-
mediary 2 creates an externality between the intermediaries. It is natural
to assume that each intermediary sets its optimal incentive scheme non-
cooperatively with decisions forming a Nash equilibrium. In a symmetric
equilibrium, the externality built in via the bailout will lead to each rm
increasing risk taking and lowering e¤ort compared to the case where the
externality that is imposing on the other rm is taken into account. There
is now a risk-taking complementarity between the intermediaries. And this
generates a additional source of market failure.15
It is straightforward to show, without fully characterizing the symmetric
equilibrium of this game, that the equilibrium level of risk-taking will in-
crease. Recall from Proposition 2 that in a market equilibrium, e = A() ()
and r = B() () : Consider rm i for whom ei = A(i) (i) and r =
B(i) (i). Suppose rj goes up or ej goes down, which makes pL (ej; rj) go
up, and so i goes up. Then we know from Section 5 that risk-taking goes
up.
15In future work, it would be interesting to explore these issues with correlated project
returns. Moreover, rms may face incentives to o¤er workers incentives to induce excess
correlation in returns because they know that investors are insured when all rms face a
bad shock together.
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7.2 Multiple Jurisdictions
We have studied a single jurisdiction providing a bailout within its borders in
a closed economy. But one feature of the current debate and of the nancial
crisis is multiple governments interacting via open markets for capital and
talent.
Here, therefore, we consider the consequences of allowing mobile talent
and capital in a world where there are two jurisdictions which determine
policy on the bailout as well as taxation and regulation. If policies are welfare
maximizing and coordinated across jurisdictions, then the model essentially
collapses back to what we have studied so far. So the interesting case is
where two countries are setting policy non-cooperatively within their own
jurisdictional boundary.
To be concrete label these countries as A and B and suppose that the
policy vector in country J is

tJ ; J ; J
	
. We follow focus on the case where
the two countries are symmetric. Suppose that rms are xed in locations
but nancial sector workers and capital can move costlessly to any location.
We continue to assume that nancial sector workers are scarce relative to the
number of nancial rms and the amount of capital in any jurisdiction. So,
in principle, any country could become specialized in nancial services. We
will begin by studying the case A = B =  and each bailout is nanced in
the country where the investment takes place. In the absence of taxation and
regulation, then each jurisdiction is equally attractive as a home for nancial
services.
Now consider, however, what happens when the two jurisdictions set tax
and regulation policy non-cooperatively. In this case, the tax will be tA =
tB = 0. The latter follows the standard logic of tax competition applied
to this setting. It reects the fact that if the tax were positive then a
government could undercut by a small amount and steal the tax base. Hence,
we would not expect bonus taxes to survive with free mobility and policy
competition. This is because, as we saw in the last section, the bonus tax is
primarily a redistributive instrument.
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In the case of the regulation, the nding is more optimistic and both
jurisdictions will set A = B = . This is because optimal regulation raises
the utility of the nancial sector workers as well as total surplus. Hence
workers will migrate from a poorly regulated to a well-regulated jurisdiction.
Thus, we do not expect any race to the bottom in regulating the structure
of bonuses.
Suppose now that the generosity of bailouts di¤ers across jurisdictions so
that A > B. Then, even with optimal regulation, nancial intermediation
will migrate towards the high bailout jurisdiction.16 Moreover, productive
e¤ort will be lower than is desirable in this jurisdiction. And from a world
welfare point of view, nancial intermediation will be carried out in the least
e¢ cient place. So e¤orts to curb bailouts would benet from coordination
to keep a level playing eld. This is currently an issue where, with di¤ering
scal positions restricting the credibility of bailouts in some jurisdictions,
we would expect a movement of nancial intermediation to places where
governments have deeper pockets. Coordinated tax policy on bonuses could
be used to o¤set this but would require jurisdictions to cooperate to avoid
the standard race to the bottom.
7.3 Implementation Issues
Even at a conceptual level, there is a question of how far it is reasonable to
assume that a regulator is fully informed about the technology of produc-
tion in the nancial sector. This is embodied in our assumption that the
parameter  is known by the regulator. If not, then additional complica-
tions would be introduced. Certainly extending the analysis to have  to
be private information to the nancial intermediary is an interesting exten-
sion. One could then study optimal regulatory mechanisms. In practice,
the use of such mechanisms is likely to be severely circumscribed by the fact
that nancial regulators are not typically able to use transfers as means of
16Combining this with the discussion of optimal bailouts in the last section, this is
a possible of source policy externalities across jurisdictions if one jurisdiction is more
susceptable to lobbying for bailouts than another.
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achieving self-selection. This may mean that a pooling solution is the only
option where the average  is used to regulate the nancial sector making it
impossible to have such a nely tuned system of bonus regulation.
Perhaps an even bigger practical issue would arise from the possibility of
nancial regulation which means that  is constantly changing, even varying
over the business cycle, and would make it di¢ cult to have any kind of
xed rule that would achieve optimal bonuses to limit socially sub-optimal
forms of risk-taking by nancial rms. In practice, we would be likely
to see only crude e¤orts to bring regulations on bonus structures. Once
that dimension is imperfect, e¤orts to try to get better signals of r in our
framework becomes pressing. It would generally be optimal for the regulator
to use such information in assessing bonus structures.
But all of these practical concerns should not make us lose sight of one
very simple and general implication of our model, namely, that greater trans-
parency in the reporting of bonus structures at all levels of nancial rms is
warranted from a public interest point of view. Attempts by regulators to
bring these into the daylight as a means of assessing their implications for
risk-taking is perfectly justied once the social implications of risk-taking in
the presence of bailouts is recognized.
7.4 Over-optimism bias
Finally, note that while we have focused here on bailouts as the source of
sub-optimal incentives in the nancial sector, the general structure that we
have proposed could be applied to a wider variety of market imperfections
a¤ecting investment returns. It could, for example, be used to study the im-
plications of psychological biases in risk perceptions that encourage excessive
risk-taking. Such cases would also a¤ect both e¢ ciency and distribution.
To illustrate this, consider the case where  = 0. Suppose though that
investors, workers and principals in the nancial sector all over-estimate .
Let ^ >  be their belief with:
^H   M > H   M = 0:
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Such over-optimism about the returns to risk taking will lead nancial inter-
mediaries to set incentives for workers so that r > 0 even though they would
not do this if they had the correctbelief. As in the bailout model, this
could motivate the need to regulate bonus pay to reduce risk taking. How-
ever, the motivation for this would essentially be paternalistic. However, a
combination of decision making biases and bailouts would further compound
the cost of bailouts.
More generally, the analysis points towards wider debates about connect-
ing nance with their broad economic purpose and focusing on the true social
costs and benets from nancial market development.17
8 Concluding Comments
The debate about bonus pay has been thrown into sharp relief by the nan-
cial crisis. But, even before its onset, there were concerns about rewards
earned in the nancial sector and their implications for inequality and fair-
ness. Once it was clear that it was tax payers rather than investors who are
the true residual claimants, this put a whole new gloss on the issue of pay in
the nancial sector and the sources of the returns that generated such high
rewards.
The case remains for implementing structural reforms in the banking sec-
tor which reduce the likelihood of bailouts. A variety of measures currently
under debate include trying to get the optimal structure of banking and of
macro-prudential regulation which reduce the payo¤s of socially sub-optimal
risk-taking. But the reality is likely to remain that governments will continue
to nance schemes which fundamentally distort the supply price of capital to
risky projects since no democratic government will ever want to sit idly by
and watch even a moderately small group of investors lose their money in a
way that can become politically sensitive. Nowhere was this more forcefully
illustrated than in the case of Northern Rock, a mid-sized mortgage lender
17This is discussed further in Besley and Ghatak (2011) which discusses how organiza-
tional form can be used to connect nance with a social purpose.
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and the rst UK casualty of the crisis in 2007. The political heat on the UK
government from this case was intense. It is clear that standard schemes for
depositor protection and lender of the last resort facilities raise all the issues
that we have covered in this paper.
This paper has explored the implications for both equity and e¢ ciency
for taxing and regulating bonus pay in the nancial sector. We have used
a framework in which the government protects investors from downside risk
and argue that, if there is scarce talent for working in the nancial sector,
then the benets of such protection is shifted to these workers. The paper
explores the implications of this for both the structure and level of bonus
pay. Protection of investors both increases inequality and reduces e¢ ciency.
The optimal intervention is a combination of a regulation on the structure
of bonuses and a tax on their level. The argument that pay contracts are
private arrangements between consenting adults and hence to be kept secret
does not hold up once the implications of public funded protection against
the downside risks from making risky investments is taken on board.
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Proof of Proposition 1: Use:
1
2

e2 + r2

= u
to obtain:
e =
p
2u  r2:
Plug this into the maximand to obtain that
S^ ( ; u) = max
r
np
2u  r2
h
A ( ) 
p
2u  r2
i
+ r [B ( )  r]     
o
:
Di¤erentiate with respect to r to get:
  A ( )p
2u  r2 r +B ( )
Clearly this is negative at r = 0 since B ( ) < 0. Also, it is
straightforward to check that the second-order condition is satised.
Hence r = 0 as claimed. Turning to:
max
u
n
S^ ( ; u) + u
o
the rst-order condition is
A ( )p
2u  r2   2 +  = 0:
It is clear upon inspection that the second-order condition with respect
to u is satised. Since at the optimum r = 0, we get
u =
1
2

A ( )
2  
2
:
In that case:
e =
p
2u =
A ( )
2  
and we solve the optimum contract from (7) plugging in the values r = 0
and e = A( )
2  derived above.
We need to check that the participation constraint (PC) does in fact bind
at the optimum, as have assumed above. Suppose not. Then,
max
e;r
e [A ( )  e] + r [B ( )  r]     
yields e = A( )
2
and r = 0 (as B ( ) < 0). Given this, the nancial sector
workers equilibrium expected payo¤ is 1
2
e2 = 1
2
h
A( )
2
i2
and S^ ( ; u) =h
A( )
2
i2
     : Then, maxu
n
S^ ( ; u) + u
o
is increasing in u and u
33
will therefore be raised to the point where the PC must be binding. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Substituting e from the PC the objective func-
tion is
max
r
p
2u  r2
h
A () 
p
2u  r2
i
+ r [B ()  r] +    :
The rst-order condition with respect to r is:
  A ()p
2u  r2 r +B () = 0
which can be solved to obtain
r =
vuuuut
264 2u
1 +

A()
B()
2
375:
The case in Proposition 2 solves this, and zero prot condition of the
nancial intermediary:
p
2u  r2
h
A () 
p
2u  r2
i
+ r [B ()  r] +     = 0
for r and u. Observe that:
2u  r2 =

A
B
2
r2:
Using this:
p
2u  r2
h
A () 
p
2u  r2
i
+r [B ()  r]+  =
q
A ()2 +B ()2
p
2u 2u+ :
Solving this quadratic equation yields:
u =
1
2
q
A ()2 +B ()2 +
q
A ()2 +B ()2 + 4 (   )
2
:
This can now be used to obtain values of r and e: From this wH and wM
can be backed out using (7). Finally, note that the expected payo¤ of
the intermediary is decreasing in u when the PC binds. Consider the
case where the PC does not bind. In this case, the expected surplus is
e [A ()  e] + r [B ()  r] +     and maximizing it with respect to
only the incentive constraints yields a value of A()
2+B()2
4
+  which
is positive by Assumption (i). This ensures that there exists a positive
level of u that solves the competitive case where the PC binds. 
Proof of Proposition 3: The fact that  =  follows directly from Propo-
34
sition 1. To solve for the optimal bonus tax, observe that wH solves:
wH [+ (1  ) ]A ()  (1 + t) (wH [+ (1  ) ])2 +     = 0:
Now we can use the formula for wH in Proposition 1 in this expression
to yield.
A ( )A ()
2     (1 + t)

A ( )
2  
2
+     = 0:
Solving this yields the result. 
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